Collective voice of participants in the “Roundtable with Civil Society from the Western Balkans
on Challenges of European Integration” convened by the Czech Presidency of the Council of the
EU in cooperation with the CEELI Institute and the Forum 2000 Foundation. Prague, 8-9 September
2022.

A. Critical Assessment of Current Situation in the Western Balkans

High Tensions, Dangerous Rhetoric

 State-building processes in the region – democratization, rule of law, responsible civic
education, free and fair elections, fight against corruption, and independence of media – are
interconnected with issues of reconciliation.
 The whole region suffers from captured states and institutions, affecting the judiciary, public
administration, elections, and even much of the media. Political leaders lacking
accountability and dedication to democratic values in the captured states disproportionately
dominate the public space.
 Corruption has become banal – since everybody is deemed corrupt, nobody is corrupt;
clientelism has become the norm; institutions suffer from lack of trust; and nationalist
rhetoric is being used to avoid dealing with the past and distract from corruption issues.
 “Stabilitocracy” has become the term to describe the political scene in the region.
 Russian and other illiberal influences are growing in strength and – since Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine – are becoming more dangerous throughout the Balkans.
 Some media are part of the problem, spreading misinformation, hate speech and Russian
propaganda; thus media become “weaponized” or exercise self-censorship due to their
ownership linked to the captured states or political players.
 The judgements of international courts and local war crimes courts are not respected but
rather actively ignored or criticized by national leaders; war criminals are glorified; the
international presence in war crimes courts ended too early.
 The EU seems to be appeasing Serbia continuously and there are no consequences for “not
choosing the European side”; Serbia and Republika Srpska are not willing to participate in
any regional reconciliation processes; and the term “Serbian world” is increasingly used to
advocate for dangerous ideas about changing borders of BiH, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
 Overall, reconciliation has regressed. After some years of progress with RECOM, the
support by Western Balkans political leaders has stopped, and reconciliation disappeared
from the EU agenda too. The current lack of political will to engage in dialogue has
paralyzed opportunities for progress. There are no national nor regional strategies for
reconciliation, and the processes connected to reconciliation, as mentioned above, have
stalled even though they should have advanced decisively long ago.

Weakening of the EU

 The EU has become weaker in the Western Balkans, with less focus and less influence; the
policies pushed by some EU Member States are fragmented, lack consistency, and are often
seen as hypocritical or having double standards.
 The EU is seen to be more about money and no longer about political process and progress;
some in the European countries falsely consider the reconciliation processes as more or less finished and, therefore, no longer a priority – thus the focus has shifted to stability and short-term security.

 Country Reports have become inconsequential, since it now appears that progress towards
accession is not tied to them.
 Outside of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, which is plagued with a lack of transparency, the
EU has become barely visible. The other hotspots seem to be largely ignored.
 The partisan relationships of EU political groupings with Western Balkans leaders have
negative impacts on the democratic development of the region.

“Pandora’s Box” of the Bulgaria-North Macedonia Dispute

 The situation between North Macedonia and Bulgaria is currently the most problematic issue
in the region. Some Bulgaria’s demands are incompatible with European standards.
 The so-called “resolution” put forward by the French EU Presidency set a dangerous
precedent by incorporating counter-productive demands that will further complicate or halt
also other accession processes in the region.
 The credibility of the EU has been damaged by the failure to keep the promised reward of
progress in EU integration after the Prespa Agreement, and now the inclusion of bi-lateral
nationalist demands in the Negotiation Framework, thus turning those demands into a
collective position of EU Member States.
 A country imposing national narratives over another one can increase tensions, prevent open,
objective and informed historical debate, hindering peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts.
 The resulting negative geopolitical consequences for the Western Balkans are deeply
worrying.

B. Promoting Reconciliation – Revival of Principles

 Stability and security are impossible without reconciliation, and progress on reconciliation
can only be achieved by active engagement of leaders from Western Balkans countries with
political support and pressure from EU institutions and Member States; therefore,
reconciliation needs to become again a constant and topmost priority for leaders in the region
and in the EU.
 For that, national politicians in the Western Balkans should actively and openly support
initiatives on Dealing with the Past, as well as peacebuilding, transitional justice and
prosecution of war crimes.
 The EU needs to make clear that it has an agenda of change; the European integration process
of the region is crucial and reconciliation should be included as part of it; appeasement must
give way to adapted and upgraded conditionality; the EU needs to push not only technical aspects of the EU acquis but also promote European values through the accession process
(just like among its own Member States).
 The EU can mediate reconciliation using conditionality in the context of EU integration; this
mediation should be carried in accordance with international and European standards, taking
advantage of European and international expertise (including with partner international
governmental and non-governmental organisations, deploying of experts).
 A certain Normative Framework of European and International Standards and Values should
be developed and become an indispensable element in the accession process – principles and
values need to come above stability and short-term practicality.
 National leaders should re-examine and understand the importance of remembrance policies,
also setting clear standards for memorialization and civic education; a European Peace
Museum (an international forward-looking project with high symbolism, located
symbolically e.g. at the borderline between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo) could bring added
value.
 Western Balkans leaders need to push for a re-think of national narratives; currently, some
leaders are using constant accusations of victimisation by others for manipulating their
constituencies.

C. Necessary Change of Approach – Longer, Wider, Deeper

 The leaders of the Western Balkans countries and of the EU need to actively support justice,
principles, and democratization over stability.
 The EU needs to increase attention and engagement towards hotspots of tensions; design a
long-term strategy for reconciliation and regional dialogue using a staged approach; and
ensure that dialogues are inclusive, including civil society through parallel or alternative
pathways.
 A comprehensive regional “whole-of-Balkans approach” is needed, combining top-down
support from international stakeholders and bottom-up activities of civil society
organisations.
 Approaches to democratization and rule of law should be enhanced, taking advantage of
improved monitoring and assessment mechanisms, including to ensure political
accountability; elections need to be properly evaluated by longer-term monitoring that would
be able to “name and shame” those political forces that use clientelism, coercion, and bribery
to “fix” election results long before election days.
 Progress needs to be rewarded and regression needs to be pointed out clearly; there needs to
be more effective monitoring (beyond the politically expedient Country Reports), linked to
allocation of EU funds accordingly.
 The “new methodology” of EU integration needs to be used in a positive and stimulating
way to streamline the accession processes (rather than freezing them).
 Strategic communication and public diplomacy of the EU in Western Balkans needs to
improve, becoming proactive rather than reactive and engaged to promote the EU agenda;
counter-narratives are needed against the propaganda of malign players influences; and
visibility of the EU financial support should grow.

 The EU needs to be credible in its effort to promote and strengthen European values, it must
do so not only in the Western Balkans but also elsewhere, including in EU Member States,
given that processes of democratization and rule of law are still unfinished or even regressing
in many places.
 The EU and its Members States should recognize that the North Macedonia-Bulgaria dispute
is not a “done deal” after the political inter-governmental conference, but is still a hotspot
that requires engagement for conflict prevention and mitigation; avoid further tensions by
ensuring that Bulgaria no longer will “unduly block the accession process”; clarify European
negotiation standards that would avoid the new precedent of neighbours forcing concessions
that contradict EU values; promote an EU-sponsored dialogue and facilitation process in
both countries between CSOs, academia, and media, together with the inclusion of
international experts; explore alternative narratives based on modern historiography and
European standards; assist in challenging negative stereotypes in both countries; ensure
active monitoring involving also CSOs from both countries for the purposes of early warning
and confidence-building.

D. Urgent Measures

 The EU should assist the Balkan countries in overcoming the energy crisis during this winter.
The failure to do so can have serious geopolitical consequences.
 Brussels should no longer be passive towards the illiberal influences in the Balkans and
needs to actively counter them whether they originate inside or outside the EU; the threat of
Russian, Chinese or other malign influences, especially where exercised by their European
proxies,should be taken seriously and countered by all political, legal and financial measures
available.
 It is crucial to address the issues of war crimes, dealing with the past, and memorialization;
political leaders in the region and in the EU need to speak out and act against the glorification
of war criminals; war crimes prosecutors and judges should better cooperate across the
region; and the EU Victims’ Rights Directive needs to apply to Western Balkans, especially
regarding past war crimes.
 With regard to media, their associations need to be supported and professionalized; it is
important to open channels of communication and cooperation between investigative
journalists and law enforcement investigators and prosecutors; databases on politically
exposed persons need to be well-maintained and follow-up actions on that data be
encouraged.
 The EU’s appeasement of Serbia is over the top and needs to cease; the webs of corruption
need to be cut; Russian agents in Serbia should be expelled; there need to be consequences
for the inflow of Russian money in Serbia; and the EU should be more critical of illiberal
role/positions of Orthodox churches.
 Kosovo should be recognised by all EU Member States, and attain visa liberalisation.

Rule of Law, Corruption

 The EU needs to engage deeper in the implementation of reforms and design improved
accountability mechanisms; judicial responses to evidence of corruption must be stronger
and unbiased, since currently, the judiciary too often turns a blind eye to many situations
appropriate for criminal investigation.
 The EU should explore the benefits of supporting judicial vetting in the region
 The judiciaries must have reliable accountability mechanisms to ensure their true
independence and free them from clientelism.
 Throughout the region, corrupt politicians and governmental officials should be blacklisted
with the use of norms and principles inspired by the US Magnitsky Act.

Education

 Civic education, including about contemporary history and peace, needs greater support
from the EU, also financially on a permanent basis; education curricula should change
because short-term non-formal interventions are insufficient; a whole-of-society approach
is needed to promote proper civic education (and active citizenship by extension).
 Explore new narratives and ways to approach peacebuilding and reconciliation through
education recognizing that dealing with the past and peacebuilding are essential to
reconciliation; this also requires effective prosecutions of past war crimes.
 Facts established by international legal mechanisms cannot be denied or contested via
differing narratives.
 UNESCO standards on teaching history are to be promoted.
 The use of positive stories in education should be further explored and maximised.

Support to Civil Society

 The EU and other donors need to change their way of supporting CSOs in the region, since
the EU’s own reports have shown shortcomings.
 Donors should support sustained long-term (e.g. 10 years) programs and projects without
sudden changes in priorities, since short-term project-based activities do not have lasting
impact (donors shift priorities quickly and CSOs do not have enough time to foster alliances
and partners).
 CSOs should not have to compete against inter-governmental organizations for funding.
 EU funding limitations should be changed to allow CSOs in countries inside and outside the
EU to work together using a common cross-border funding mechanisms.
 Regional CSO initiatives for reconciliation in all of the ex-Yugoslav countries, including
those already in the EU, should be supported.
 Civil society organisations in the region need easier and systematic access to European
institutions to better inform EU support policies, including more stable funding for their
reconciliation work.
 A regional bloc of likeminded CSO actors could be established.

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